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Abstract
In Norway, an incentive-based regulation of electricity distribution companies, based on
revenue caps, was introduced in 1997. The revenues are adjusted annually, and the new
revenue cap is determined on the basis of last year’s revenue cap, adjusting for inflation,
productivity improvement, and load growth. The idea behind the load growth compensation
factor is that the grid companies should be compensated for increased costs due to grid
expansion. Load growth was chosen, partly because it was considered to be an exogenously
determined variable, however, in this paper, we will examine some investment incentives due
to the load growth factor of the adjustment formula of the Norwegian regulation.
1. Introduction
Grid investments are normally done in electrical networks in order to achieve a well
functioning integrated electricity market and/or making the network more secure, i.e. less
sensitive to link failures. In general, there are two aspects to be considered when making a
new grid investment, the first is that of detecting beneficial investments, and the second is
how to induce them under the chosen market regime. In networks with adaptive routing it is
well known that network “improvements”, i.e. strengthening a line or building a new line,
may in fact be detrimental to social surplus, and that some agents may have incentives to
advocate these changes.
The revenue cap regulation for grid companies is part of the market regime. Accordingly, in
this paper we will illustrate by means of simple numerical examples that a grid company,
operating under a revenue cap regulation, may have incentives to invest in new lines that
2temporarily reduce transmitted energy. Hence, the incentive-based revenue regulation regime
used in Norway can lead to a peculiar investment behavior.
2. The Norwegian Revenue Regulation Regime
Since the Norwegian electricity market was deregulated in 1992, the operations of grid
companies have been regulated, since they are operating in a monopoly market. Various
regulation schemes have been used, starting with a period of Rate-of-Return regulation, which
later has been changed to a combination of an incentive-based regulation and a performance
based regulation. In addition, maximum and minimum returns on capital are determined, for
1998-2001, they are 15% and 2%, respectively. These constitute additional constraints on the
revenues, however, in this paper we will focus on the incentive-based revenue regulation,
assuming that the maximum and minimum returns are not restrictive.
In the present revenue regulation scheme (NVE [23]), the initial revenue caps are determined
on the basis of the grid companies’ accounts from 1994 and 1995, i.e.
(2-1) NTAVKAVSDVITe +++= ,
where ITe is the initial revenue cap, determined by operating and maintenance costs (DV),
depreciation (AVS), returns on invested capital (AVK) and costs associated with energy losses
(NT). NT = NTMWh · P, where NTMWh denotes losses in MWh, and P is the average system price
of energy over the year in the NordPool spot market.
Annually, the revenue caps are adjusted for a general and an individual productivity factor, an
inflation factor, and a growth factor for grid expansions. The formula for the revenue cap
adjustment is
(2-2) ( ) )5.01()1( ,111,1, nnnMWh
n
n
nnene LEEFKPNTKPI
KPINTITIT ++++ ∆⋅+⋅−⋅


⋅+



⋅−= ,
3where
ITe,n is the revenue cap of year n
KPI is the inflation factor, represented by the consumer price index
EFK is the productivity improvement factor
∆LE is the relative increase in transmitted energy (loads plus losses)
Notice that ∆LE is the increase in transmitted energy, expressed in percentages, and that a
reduction in transmitted energy is not treated as a negative increase in transferred energy.
Thus, }/)(,0max{ 1,1 nnnnn LELELELE −=∆ ++ , and increases and reductions in transferred
energy are not treated symmetrically.
One of the reasons for choosing load growth as an adjustment parameter, is that it was
considered an exogenously given parameter. However, as pointed out by Grønli et al. [14]:
“Load growth as an adjustment parameter implies unpredictable and at times incidental
compensation for grid expansion”. This is not surprising since the electricity networks are
working under an adaptive routing regime, and hence, the appearance of Braess’ paradox
(Braess [5]) can partly explain this unpredictability. As a result, there has been suggestions for
changes in the revenue cap formula, since adjustments of the revenue cap due to load growth
seems quite random. Grønli et al. [14] suggest including both load growth and customer
growth in the formula, as regression analysis indicates that load growth and increase in
customers perform equally well as adjustment factors.
In this paper we will look at the revenue cap formula as a part of the market mechanism
design in a deregulated electricity market. Our focus is on the incentives inherent in this
regulation formula, inducing the grid company to make “peculiar” grid investments in order to
increase the revenue cap as much as possible.
43. Braess’ Paradox
In user-optimizing traffic assignment problems, where each individual user is expected to
choose the path with the lower travel cost, it is well known that the equilibrium flow in a
network is generally different from the system optimal flow, minimizing total travel cost. In
this setting, Braess [5] showed that adding a new road to a congested network might increase
travel cost for all. This paradoxical effect is known as Braess’ paradox, and is well studied in
traffic networks. The reason for the traffic equilibrium paradoxes, is the behavioral
assumption that a traveler chooses the path that is best for himself without paying attention to
the effect this has on the other users (eventually including himself).
In user equilibrium, a user cannot decrease travel time by unilaterally changing his travel
route, leading us to seeing the equilibrium as a Nash equilibrium of an underlying game.
Korilis et al. [21] investigate the non-cooperative structure of certain networks, where the
term non-cooperative emphasizes that the networks are “operated according to a decentralized
control paradigm, where control decisions are made by each user independently, according to
its own individual performance objectives”. Nash equilibria are generally Pareto inefficient as
is demonstrated by Dubey [13], and Korilis et al. use the Internet as an example, while
referring more generally to queuing networks.
Cohen and Horowitz [11] give examples of Braess’ paradox for other non-cooperative
networks like mechanical systems (strings) and hydraulic and electrical networks, and point to
the need for specifications of conditions, under which general networks behave paradoxically.
This is partly provided by Calvert and Keady [9], and Korilis et al. [21] propose methods for
avoiding degradation of performance, when adding resources to non-cooperative networks.
In the following sections, we will give examples of paradoxical situations that can occur in
electrical networks due to electrons behaving “non-cooperatively”, and how this, combined
with a revenue cap adjustment formula including load growth, might lead to strange
investment behavior from a grid company. The “non-cooperative” behavior of electrons is
reflected in the power flow equations describing the load flows in the network (Dolan and
Aldous [12]). As shown in Bjørndal and Jørnsten [3], the power flow equations can be seen as
the first order conditions of an optimization problem. Hence, the optimal dispatch problem,
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problem, consisting of an upper level program, which is the social maximization problem, and
a lower level program, determining the underlying physical equilibrium. Consequently, the
optimal dispatch problem is similar to Stackelberg leader-follower games or principal-agent
problems.
When computing the economic equilibria, we assume competitive electricity markets, i.e. we
do not consider gaming in the form of strategic bids. In that respect, our analysis follows the
same line of research in electricity markets that was performed by Hallefjord et al. [15] for
elastic traffic equilibria. Moreover, we assume that congestion is managed by means of
optimal nodal prices, although zonal pricing is actually used in the Norwegian scheduled (day-
ahead) power market1. For a discussion of the Norwegian zonal pricing regime, see Bjørndal
and Jørnsten [4]. Zonal pricing, which is an approximation of nodal pricing, requiring that
prices are uniform within specified zones, cannot be expected to mitigate the incentive effects
that will be identified in this paper.
Since we are dealing with investments in a network with adaptive routing, we should note the
similarity to the network design problem in traffic networks that has been well studied. (See
for instance the old network design model of LeBlanc [22], and the recent surveys of Yang et
al. [31], and Yang and Bell [32]). It should be pointed out that the network design problem in
adaptive networks is notoriously difficult, partly due to the fact that this problem is bilevel in
nature and includes discrete variables.
4. Grid Investments in Electricity Networks
In the following examples, we assume a linear lossless “DC” approximation of the power flow
equations (Wood and Wollenberg [28]), and we focus on real power. Wu et al. [30] show a 3-
node example where strengthening a line by increasing its admittance may lead to larger
minimum cost. The network and initial optimal dispatch is displayed in Figure 4-1. In optimal
                                                
1 Suggestions for different mechanisms for managing congestion can be found in for instance Schweppe et al.
[25], Harvey et al. [16], Hogan [17], Chao and Peck [10], and Wu and Varaiya [29].
dispatch the nodal prices will be related by 321 ppp <<  since line 1-3 is congested in
direction from 1 to 3 (for an argument, see Wu et al.). If the admittance of line 2-3 is
increased, the power flow equations change, and flow will increase on path 1-3-2 if injections
are maintained. This will result in line 1-3 becoming overloaded, and injection in the lower
priced node 1 must be reduced. Hence, by increasing the admittance, the former feasible
power flow becomes infeasible, and this can be viewed as the physical paradox that results
from the underlying physical equilibrium model. If consumption is to be maintained, injection
in node 3 must increase, leading to larger minimum cost. Hence, an economic paradox occurs,
that is the result of the underlying characteristics of the physical equilibrium model.
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8congestion rent, providing grid owners incentives to invest in a link that increases cost (even
without considering the investment cost of the new link2).
The merchandizing surplus corresponds to the revenue from capacity charges in the central
grid (Statnett [26]). However, capacity charges, which together with charges for losses and
fixed charges, constitute the revenues of “Sentralnettsordningen”, have no direct influence on
the revenues of the grid owners like Statnett, the system operator of the Norwegian grid, and
the major grid owner in the transmission network. This is because the revenues of the grid
owners are determined by the revenue caps, implying that if a grid owner takes some action to
increase capacity charges, it will not necessarily increase revenue.
In Bjørndal and Jørnsten [2], we show that even with supply and demand present in every
node, and demand being elastic, it is easy to find instances where a new line reduces social
surplus and increases the merchandizing surplus. One example is given in Figure 4-3, where a
new line is built between nodes 2 and 4, and line 1-2 is congested. In Figure 4-3 optimal nodal
prices, pi, net injections3, qi, and line flows are displayed.
Since we assume a lossless network, transmitted energy is equal to the sum of net withdrawals
(or net injections). Before the new line between nodes 2 and 4 is introduced, transmitted
energy (or power) is equal to 652.68935.46717.21123.10529.58 =+=+ . After the new line
is in place, this number is reduced to 53.727. Consequently, the merchandizing surplus
increases due to the new line, while social surplus and transmitted energy is reduced, i.e. by
making changes to the grid topology we may alter one of the determinants of the revenue cap.
Hence, given a revenue cap regulation that includes a load growth factor, the grid company
may have incentives to suggest an investment that reduces the load. Such an investment will
not have any negative effect on the revenue cap since only load growth is accounted for, and a
temporary load decrease will not affect the revenue cap negatively. The reason why a grid
company has incentives to suggest such an investment is that when, in the future period, a new
grid investment is being made, the load growth is measured from a lower basis. This makes
the load growth adjustment factor larger and the revenue cap larger.
                                                
2 Grid owners could argue in favor of the new link, because it improves on the security of the system. In case of
link-failure on 1-3 or 2-3, the grid is still connected when line 1-2 is present.
3 Net withdrawals are indicated by negative numbers.
9Figure 4-3 Optimal Dispatch before and after Line 2-4
5. Grid Investments and Revenue Caps
In the following, we will give an example of how a strategic investment in new lines can
increase the revenue cap by exploiting the fact that increases and reductions in transmitted
energy are not treated symmetrically in the revenue cap adjustment formula (2-2). Our
example is a 6-node network with 4 possible new links, A, B, C and D, like the grid in Figure
5-1.
p1=15.284
q1=58.529
p4=16.048
q4=-46.935
2
p1=14.741
q1=42.244
p4=16.478
q4=-37.493
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Part A: No Line between Nodes 2 and 4
Social Surplus: 2878.526
Merchandizing Surplus: 45.848p2=17.577
q2=10.123p3=16.813
q3=-21.71715.003.40625.1243.5p2=17.635
q2=11.48315.001.99514.2327.2Part B: New Line between Nodes 2 and 4
Social Surplus: 2852.660
Merchandizing Surplus: 69.444p3=17.056
q3=-16.23412.24
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where n is the number of nodes in the network, m is the number of links, )( di
d
i qp  is the
demand function of node i , diq  is the quantity of real power consumed in node i, )(
s
i
s
i qp  is
the supply function of node i , and siq  is the quantity of real power produced in node i. ijC  is
the capacity of link ij , and ijq  is the power flow over the link from i  to j .
The objective function (5-1) expresses the difference between consumer benefit (the area
under the demand curve) and the cost of production (the area under the supply curve).
Equations (5-2) correspond to Kirchhoff’s junction rule, and there are 1−n  independent
equations. Equations (5-3) represent Kirchhoff’s loop rule, where ),,( 11 +−= nmLLL K
represents a set of independent loops (Dolan and Aldous [12]), and lL  is the set of directed
arcs in a path going through loop l. Equation (5-4) stands for conservation of energy, while
inequalities (5-5) are the capacity constraints.
For simplicity, we assume linear cost and demand functions, represented by siii qcp =  and
d
iiii qbap −=  where ip  is the price in node i, and ia , ib  and ic  are positive constants. Input
data for our numerical experiment is given in Table 5-1.
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Table 5-1 Input Parameters
CONSUMPTION PRODUCTIONNODE
ia ib ic
1 20 0.05 0.1
2 20 0.05 0.6
3 20 0.05 0.1
4 20 0.05 0.4
5 20 0.05 0.5
6 20 0.05 0.4
We will assume supply and demand parameters to be constant over the 4 periods, and that
lines 1-6, 2-3 and the new line D have limited capacities, each equal to 20 units. The
capacities of the other lines are assumed to be non-restrictive in the solutions.
In table Table 5-2, we show the social surplus for each period and for each grid expansion
path. Period 0 corresponds to the initial state of the network, i.e. the radial network without
any of the new lines installed. In period 1, one additional link is installed, which link depends
on the expansion path. In period 2, a second additional link is installed, etc. The different
expansion paths are numbered as follows:
1  A-B-C-D   2  A-B-D-C   3  A-C-B-D   4  A-C-D-B   5  A-D-B-C   6  A-D-C-B
7  B-A-C-D   8  B-A-D-C   9  B-C-A-D   10 B-C-D-A   11 B-D-A-C   12 B-D-C-A
13 C-A-B-D   14 C-A-D-B   15 C-B-A-D   16 C-B-D-A   17 C-D-A-B   18 C-D-B-A
19 D-A-B-C   20 D-A-C-B   21 D-B-A-C   22 D-B-C-A   23 D-C-A-B   24 D-C-B-A
As can be seen from the numbers in Table 5-2, total social surplus for each period does not
vary a lot, the difference between the highest and lowest surplus being less than 3%.
Table 5-2 Social Surplus
             0           1           2           3           4
1     4475.407    4453.466    4465.225    4543.497    4564.998
2     4475.407    4453.466    4465.225    4522.268    4564.998
3     4475.407    4453.466    4547.967    4543.497    4564.998
4     4475.407    4453.466    4547.967    4564.399    4564.998
5     4475.407    4453.466    4516.537    4522.268    4564.998
6     4475.407    4453.466    4516.537    4564.399    4564.998
7     4475.407    4481.369    4465.225    4543.497    4564.998
8     4475.407    4481.369    4465.225    4522.268    4564.998
9     4475.407    4481.369    4551.747    4543.497    4564.998
10    4475.407    4481.369    4551.747    4572.917    4564.998
11    4475.407    4481.369    4535.614    4522.268    4564.998
12    4475.407    4481.369    4535.614    4572.917    4564.998
13
13    4475.407    4550.234    4547.967    4543.497    4564.998
14    4475.407    4550.234    4547.967    4564.399    4564.998
15    4475.407    4550.234    4551.747    4543.497    4564.998
16    4475.407    4550.234    4551.747    4572.917    4564.998
17    4475.407    4550.234    4572.432    4564.399    4564.998
18    4475.407    4550.234    4572.432    4572.917    4564.998
19    4475.407    4532.775    4516.537    4522.268    4564.998
20    4475.407    4532.775    4516.537    4564.399    4564.998
21    4475.407    4532.775    4535.614    4522.268    4564.998
22    4475.407    4532.775    4535.614    4572.917    4564.998
23    4475.407    4532.775    4572.432    4564.399    4564.998
24    4475.407    4532.775    4572.432    4572.917    4564.998
In Table 5-3, we show transmitted energy for the different periods along the different
expansion paths. Contrary to total social surplus, the variations are quite large, ranging from
64.089 to 113.727, a difference of 77.5%. We also see that some expansion paths show
considerable fluctuations in energy transmitted, and this will affect the development of the
revenue caps.
Table 5-3 Transmitted Energy
             0           1           2           3           4
1       84.516      64.089      68.491      96.401     106.498
2       84.516      64.089      68.491      84.780     106.498
3       84.516      64.089     100.568      96.401     106.498
4       84.516      64.089     100.568     106.614     106.498
5       84.516      64.089      83.887      84.780     106.498
6       84.516      64.089      83.887     106.614     106.498
7       84.516      85.286      68.491      96.401     106.498
8       84.516      85.286      68.491      84.780     106.498
9       84.516      85.286     107.436      96.401     106.498
10      84.516      85.286     107.436     113.691     106.498
11      84.516      85.286      96.272      84.780     106.498
12      84.516      85.286      96.272     113.691     106.498
13      84.516     108.581     100.568      96.401     106.498
14      84.516     108.581     100.568     106.614     106.498
15      84.516     108.581     107.436      96.401     106.498
16      84.516     108.581     107.436     113.691     106.498
17      84.516     108.581     113.727     106.614     106.498
18      84.516     108.581     113.727     113.691     106.498
19      84.516      99.160      83.887      84.780     106.498
20      84.516      99.160      83.887     106.614     106.498
21      84.516      99.160      96.272      84.780     106.498
22      84.516      99.160      96.272     113.691     106.498
23      84.516      99.160     113.727     106.614     106.498
24      84.516      99.160     113.727     113.691     106.498
In the tables below, we assume an initial revenue of 1 in period 0. The four tables show how
the revenue cap develops for each period along each of the 24 different expansion paths. The
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revenue caps are adjusted for one half of the percentage increase in transmitted energy,
according to formula (2-2). Since there is no adjustment for decreases in transmitted energy,
and since we ignore productivity requirements, the revenue caps cannot be reduced from one
period to the next along the same expansion path.
Revenue: Period 1
1  1.000,    2  1.000,    3  1.000,    4  1.000,    5  1.000,    6  1.000
7  1.005,    8  1.005,    9  1.005,    10 1.005,    11 1.005,    12 1.005
13 1.142,    14 1.142,    15 1.142,    16 1.142,    17 1.142,    18 1.142
19 1.087,    20 1.087,    21 1.087,    22 1.087,    23 1.087,    24 1.087
Revenue: Period 2
1  1.034,    2  1.034,    3  1.285,    4  1.285,    5  1.154,    6  1.154
7  1.005,    8  1.005,    9  1.135,    10 1.135,    11 1.069,    12 1.069
13 1.142,    14 1.142,    15 1.142,    16 1.142,    17 1.169,    18 1.169
19 1.087,    20 1.087,    21 1.087,    22 1.087,    23 1.166,    24 1.166
Revenue: Period 3
1  1.245,    2  1.157,    3  1.285,    4  1.323,    5  1.161,    6  1.311
7  1.209,    8  1.124,    9  1.135,    10 1.168,    11 1.069,    12 1.166
13 1.142,    14 1.177,    15 1.142,    16 1.176,    17 1.169,    18 1.169
19 1.092,    20 1.234,    21 1.087,    22 1.185,    23 1.166,    24 1.166
Revenue: Period 4
1  1.310,    2  1.306,    3  1.352,    4  1.323,    5  1.309,    6  1.311
7  1.273,    8  1.268,    9  1.194,    10 1.168,    11 1.206,    12 1.166
13 1.202,    14 1.177,    15 1.202,    16 1.176,    17 1.169,    18 1.169
19 1.232,    20 1.234,    21 1.226,    22 1.185,    23 1.166,    24 1.166
The maximal revenue cap in period 4, equal to 1.352, is obtained using expansion path 3, i.e.
investing in link A in the first period, C in the second, B in the third, and finally D in the last
period. This is contrasted with the revenue cap of 1.166 of expansion path 23, investing
consecutively in links D, C, A and B. Thus, the revenue cap following from choosing the best
investment sequence for the grid company is 13.76% higher than those of the inferior
sequences (23, 12, and 24). Comparing the total revenues over the 4 periods (discounting by
7% per period in the summation) gives similar differences between the best (4) and worst (11)
expansion path. The exact numbers are displayed below.
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Total revenue over 4 periods, discounted by 7%
1  3.854,    2  3.779,    3  4.137,    4  4.146,    5  3.889,    6  4.013
7  3.774,    8  3.701,    9  3.768,    10 3.775,    11 3.666,    12 3.714
13 3.915,    14 3.924,    15 3.915,    16 3.922,    17 3.936,    18 3.936
19 3.797,    20 3.913,    21 3.787,    22 3.836,    23 3.876,    24 3.876
When the revenue cap regulation is commented on by the industry, there is a certain interest in
increasing the compensation factor for increases in transmitted energy, see for instance
Statnett [27]. This is, of course, not surprising. In the tables below, we show the development
of the revenue cap when the adjustment factor for load growth is equal to 1 (instead of 0.5) in
formula (2-2), i.e. if the revenue cap is adjusted for the whole increase in transmitted energy.
Revenue: Period 1
1  1.000,    2  1.000,    3  1.000,    4  1.000,    5  1.000,    6  1.000
7  1.009,    8  1.009,    9  1.009,    10 1.009,    11 1.009,    12 1.009
13 1.285,    14 1.285,    15 1.285,    16 1.285,    17 1.285,    18 1.285
19 1.173,    20 1.173,    21 1.173,    22 1.173,    23 1.173,    24 1.173
Revenue: Period 2
1  1.069,    2  1.069,    3  1.569,    4  1.569,    5  1.309,    6  1.309
7  1.009,    8  1.009,    9  1.271,    10 1.271,    11 1.139,    12 1.139
13 1.285,    14 1.285,    15 1.285,    16 1.285,    17 1.346,    18 1.346
19 1.173,    20 1.173,    21 1.173,    22 1.173,    23 1.346,    24 1.346
Revenue: Period 3
1  1.504,    2  1.323,    3  1.569,    4  1.664,    5  1.323,    6  1.664
7  1.420,    8  1.249,    9  1.271,    10 1.345,    11 1.139,    12 1.345
13 1.285,    14 1.362,    15 1.285,    16 1.360,    17 1.346,    18 1.346
19 1.186,    20 1.491,    21 1.173,    22 1.386,    23 1.346,    24 1.346
Revenue: Period 4
1  1.662,    2  1.662,    3  1.734,    4  1.664,    5  1.662,    6  1.664
7  1.569,    8  1.569,    9  1.404,    10 1.345,    11 1.431,    12 1.345
13 1.419,    14 1.362,    15 1.419,    16 1.360,    17 1.346,    18 1.346
19 1.490,    20 1.491,    21 1.474,    22 1.386,    23 1.346,    24 1.346
Total revenue over 4 periods discounted by 7%
1  4.364,    2  4.216,    3  4.909,    4  4.932,    5  4.425,    6  4.705
7  4.181,    8  4.041,    9  4.162,    10 4.178,    11 3.960,    12 4.062
13 4.454,    14 4.474,    15 4.454,    16 4.470,    17 4.501,    18 4.501
19 4.226,    20 4.476,    21 4.203,    22 4.309,    23 4.397,    24 4.397
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In period 4, the difference between the best expansion path (3) and the worst (10 or 12) is now
close to 30%. For the discounted total revenue over the four years, the difference between the
best (4) and worst (11) expansion path is 24,5%.
6. Suggested Cures
As indicated by the examples presented, the regulatory regime for the transmission grid can
have undesired effects on investment behavior. Given that an investment already has been
carried out, in the case of traffic equilibria, marginal cost pricing can lead to improved overall
system performance from grid modifications even when Braess’ paradox occurs in user
equilibrium (Pas and Principio [24]). In electricity networks there is no equivalent
methodology, since electrons do not respond to marginal cost pricing. To alter line flows for a
given set of injections, we would have to alter line impedances, i.e. the physical characteristics
of the network.
The examples exhibited in section 4, that are similar to the classical Braess’ paradox, show
that having the merchandizing surplus as a determinant of grid revenue, may have undesirable
effects regarding grid investments. Instead of investing in new capacity in order to relieve
congestion, there are incentives to aggravate the constraints such that grid revenue increases.
Such behavior is easy to detect in our simple examples, but exceedingly difficult to monitor
and regulate in practice. The issue of how to encouraging beneficial investments and
discouraging detrimental investments in this type of regime has been treated in the literature,
for instance by Baldick and Kahn [1], Bushnell and Stoft [6] [7] [8] and Hogan [19]. As is
shown by Bushnell and Stoft [6] [7], transmission congestion contracts (TCCs), where new
contracts are allocated according to a feasibility rule, which helps internalizing the external
effects of detrimental grid investments, can provide at least a partial solution.
In the Norwegian regulatory regime, merchandizing surplus does not in the same way provide
investment incentives (or disincentives), because it has no direct effect on grid revenue.
However, as is demonstrated by the examples of section 5, also the Norwegian regulation can
induce “peculiar” investment behavior, as load growth and load reductions are not treated
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symmetrically, and possible to manipulate by investment decisions. In this paper we have
examined the sequencing of a given investment program. However, one should also be aware
of the fact that changes in power flows can be induced by more subtle changes to the network
than grid investments, for instance through the use of switches, shut-downs and changes in
reactive power (Hogan [18], Kahn and Baldick [20]). This implies that a regulation relying on
extensive monitoring, is extremely difficult in complex real world networks, with great
information asymmetry between transmission owners / system operator and any other party.
In formula (2-2) the adjustment factor for load growth was chosen partly because it was
considered an exogenously given parameter. We have demonstrated that it is not, and one
solution could be to use a different factor for the annual adjustment of revenue caps, for
instance customer growth as suggested by Grønli et al. [14].
7. Conclusions and Future Research
In this paper, we have seen that depending on the parameters of the problem considered (cost,
demand, thermal capacity and admittance) a new line may be detrimental to social surplus
and/or reduce transmitted energy. Thus, whether grid revenues are determined by the
merchandizing surplus or by revenue caps like in the Norwegian system, the fact that the
determinants of the revenues can be manipulated may lead to strange investment behavior. In
general, some agents are better off while others loose due to such behavior. The possibility of
paradoxical effects and the incentives that they provide to different agents must clearly be
taken into consideration both in the process of grid development and regulation.
While reading the documents on the regulation (NVE [23]), one finds that it is a rather
complicated structure, and there may be other parts of the regulation that is well worth an
examination. For instance, the annual revenue caps are based on expected increases in
transmitted energy, and every 5 years the regulator, i.e. NVE, will adjust the revenue cap on
the basis of variances between expected and actual increases in transmitted energy. According
to the formulas of the regulation documents, forecasting errors are penalties and savings that
go into the initial revenue cap for the next 5-year period, adjusted for the risk-free rate of
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interest. It could be interesting to investigate what kind of incentives this provides for the
forecasting of transmitted energy.
Finally, we have already commented on the extreme difficulty of dealing with investments in
networks with adaptive routing. Bushnell and Stoft [8] point to the fact that the performance
of an electric network depends on expected dispatch, which is influenced by future supply and
demand conditions, which are constantly changing and subject to uncertainty. Thus, as market
conditions change, so can the performance of the different network configurations considered.
This is further complicated by typically long asset lifetimes and the lumpiness of the
investment decisions, which sometimes makes it desirable to expand the network in a manner
that is not immediately beneficial but will be in the long run. Ideally, we should compare
different expansion paths rather than various fixed networks, as the investment problem is
dynamic in nature.
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